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SUMMARY
Reform of the rural water supply sector occurred widely in the 1990s, when many low-income countries replaced state-led service
provision with decentralized community management in the hope of generating improved technical and ﬁnancial performance. This
article asks whether these expected beneﬁts have materialized in practice, and whether community management has strengthened
institutional capacity at local, district and national level. Findings from a mixed-methods study in four districts of Malawi show that
both technical and ﬁnancial performance under community management is weak. Maintenance is rarely done, repairs are slow and
sub-standard, and user committees are unable to collect and save funds: Average savings are just 2% of expected levels. Despite
these failures, community management has ‘worked’ for the state (and donors) as a means of ofﬂoading responsibility for public
service provision. The article suggests elements of an alternative framework for rural water supply that would tackle the technical
and ﬁnancial failures of community management, and notes that efforts to promote ‘local ownership’ in development must be
undertaken with care. © 2015 The Authors. Public Administration and Development published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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Reform of the rural water supply sector occurred widely in the 1990s, whenmany low-income countries replaced state-
led centralized service provision with decentralized community management (Schouten and Moriarty, 2003). Al-
though decentralization and citizen participation have been important elements of many public sector reforms, the rural
water sector is unique in the degree to which ‘local ownership’ has been institutionalized over the past 25years. In the
context of renewed attention to local ownership in public sector reform, exempliﬁed by the call for ‘doing development
differently’ and its emphasis on locally driven problem deﬁnition (Doing Development Differently: The Manifesto), it
seems timely to reﬂect on whether the anticipated beneﬁts of community management have materialized. This article
addresses this question using data from a mixed-methods study of community-managed rural water supply in Malawi.
The article is organized as follows. The next section traces the emergence of community management as a reform
intended to solve problems in the rural water supply sector and situates it in the wider context of public sector reform.
The expected beneﬁts of community management are outlined, along with some key critiques and concerns, leading
to the research questions. I next introduce the case of Malawi and explain the design, methods and data sources used
in this study. Following, I compare expected and actual performance under community management in three key
areas: technical, ﬁnancial and institutional performance. The ﬁndings show that service delivery under the community
management model is considerably less impressive than theory suggests. I then discuss why the model persists
despite these ﬂaws, consider the implications for ‘local ownership’ and ‘doing development differently’, and make
some tentative suggestions as to what an alternative framework might entail.*Correspondence to: E. Chowns, Teaching Fellow, International Development Department, School of Government and Society, University of
Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK. E-mail: e.e.chowns@bham.ac.uk
© 2015 The Authors. Public Administration and Development published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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Rural water supply
At the global level, recent decades have seen signiﬁcant increases in access to improved water sources, and the
Millennium Development Goal target on water was declared met in 2010 (UNICEF/WHO Joint Monitoring
Programme, 2015a). However, major inequalities persist both between and within countries: Only two-thirds
of people in sub-Saharan Africa have access to clean water, and the ﬁgure is considerably lower in rural areas
(Ibid.) Furthermore, a signiﬁcant proportion of ‘improved’ water sources do not in fact provide clean or safe
water (UNICEF/WHO Joint Monitoring Programme, 2011).
In sub-Saharan Africa, most clean water is delivered via community-managed water points, either handpumps
or (for a small proportion of users) piped gravity-fed systems (UNICEF/WHO Joint Monitoring Programme,
2015a). However, available ﬁgures show that many such water points do not work: Roughly one-third are
non-functional across the continent (RWSN, 2009), and research from Tanzania suggests that one-quarter of
new water points become non-functional within 2 years of installation (Taylor, 2009). This level of failure calls
into question the long-term sustainability of the gains achieved through recent increases in investment in rural
water supply.
Improving access to clean water, and increasing the sustainability of services, has been a development
concern since at least the 1980s, the International Decade of Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation. At that time,
serious problems with the then-current model of centralized service delivery were identiﬁed: Unresponsive
bureaucracies failed to provide maintenance and repair, and an overstretched public purse was unable to afford
the necessary expansion of services (Arlosoroff et al., 1987; Briscoe and Ferranti, 1988). In response, the
community management approach – ‘the idea that communities should operate and maintain their own water
supply systems’ (Schouten and Moriarty, 2003: 1) – was developed and widely promoted. Through a series of
conferences and communiques, including the 1990 Delhi Statement and the 1992 Dublin Principles, this
approach rapidly came to dominate policy, practice and discourse in the rural water supply sector (Nicol
et al., 2012).
The core of the community management model is the Water Point Committee, typically a group of 6 to 10
villagers elected or otherwise delegated by their community to take responsibility for a water point such as a borehole
with handpump, a protected spring, or a gravity-fed tap. The committee has a formal structure, with a Chair and
treasurer, and is intended to be gender-balanced. Its responsibilities are both technical (maintaining and repairing
the water point) and ﬁnancial (collecting and saving community contributions so that funds are available for mainte-
nance and repairs). Villagers contribute through regular payment of user fees, as well as through initial cash or in-kind
contributions towards installation. Committee members are typically provided with a week’s training when they are
ﬁrst appointed and then expected to take on permanent responsibility for management of the water point. The
responsibility of the state in this model is limited to (i) facilitating installation of new water points, either directly
or through coordinating development partners, and (ii) provisioning ‘backstopping’ support to committees.
Expected beneﬁts of community management
Community management was expected to lead to more efﬁcient and effective water services in two key respects.
First, better technical performance would result thanks to more frequent maintenance and faster repairs by local
technicians. Community-based mechanics would not face the barriers of distance and poor communications that
contributed to slow response times from centralized maintenance teams; instead, they would be immediately on
hand – and would have strong incentives to make repairs quickly because they themselves would also be users
of the affected water point. Community managers would also be in a much better position to conduct the regular
tests and preventive maintenance that are recommended to ensure continued water point functionality (Erpf, 2007).
Second, community management was expected to lead to improved ﬁnancial sustainability in the sector. It was
suggested that the ﬁnancial burden of ongoing operation and maintenance of water supply services was too great
for the state and that the only way to generate the funds needed was through user contributions (Briscoe and
Ferranti, 1988). Users would have a direct interest in making such contributions as they would see a clear link© 2015 The Authors. Public Administration and Development published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. 35, 263–276 (2015)
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reduced costs in the long term (Baumann, 2006).
The mechanism through which these beneﬁts were to be delivered was institutional reform: a reconﬁguration of
the roles and responsibilities of actors through the public service delivery chain. Community management represented
a radical decentralization of responsibility from paid experts to unpaid amateurs. The themes of decentralization and
citizen participation were, of course, prominent far beyond the water sector during this period (Bardhan, 2002;
McCourt, 2013; Faguet, 2014). Decentralization was one of the key ways in which development actors hoped that
services could be made to work better for the poor (World Bank, 2004). Community management was thus a public
sector reform that was ‘all things to all people’. It appealed to those on the right of the political spectrum because it
promised to shrink the state and deliver more for less; and it appealed to those on the left because it promised to
transfer power to the people and deliver better outcomes.Concerns and critiques
While there was certainly great optimism about the potential of community management in the early days (Narayan,
1995; Sara and Katz, 1997), critiques began to emerge fairly quickly and have since grown in volume. There is now a
signiﬁcant and critical practitioner literature (e.g., Schouten and Moriarty, 2003; Harvey and Reed, 2007; Lockwood
and Smits, 2011) and considerable debate within the sector regarding the shortcomings of the model. Although a few
practitioners (e.g., Lane, 2012) still claim that community management works, most assessments acknowledge that it
has serious problems. In the words of one major sector initiative, ‘the community management model has brought
many beneﬁts; however, in most countries around the world it has by and large failed to achieve the ultimate goal
of reliable and sustainable water supply at scale’ (Triple-S, 2009: 1).
On the technical side, critics have argued that maintenance is rarely done (Colin, 1999) and that there are often
long delays in organizing repairs (Hope, 2015). Community mechanics may not have the skills required and
indeed community involvement in technical decision-making may lead to sub-optimal choices (Khwaja,
2009). Lack of adequate supervision contributes to technical failures (Golooba-Mutebi, 2012), and indeed,
research in Indonesia shows that community supervision is less effective as a quality control mechanism than
professional audit and inspection (Olken, 2005). The capacity of communities to shoulder the burden of
maintenance and repairs alone has been called into question; instead, they need to be effectively connected to
local authorities (Kleemeier, 2000; Cleaver, 2012). Over the last decade, there has been a shift in discourse in
the sector towards emphasis on water as a service, with key ﬁgures calling for increased professionalization of
rural water supply (Lockwood and Le Gouais, 2011).
The transfer of ongoing ﬁnancial responsibility to users has also been criticized, on two main grounds. First,
user payments are generally insufﬁcient to meet the actual costs of operation and maintenance (Carter et al.,
2010). While considerable effort has been invested in calculating ﬁnancing requirements (WASHCost, 2012;
McIntyre et al., 2014), in practice, payment mechanisms are often inconsistent, and actual amounts collected are
generally much lower than needed (Whittington et al., 2008; Hope, 2015). Users are generally reluctant to pay
for water, particularly if service levels are poor (Koehler et al., 2015). There are also signiﬁcant concerns regarding
the effectiveness and equity impacts of user fees. Reliance on user ﬁnancing in the water sector is inconsistent with
the shift away from such fees in other public sectors such as health and education under the auspices of efforts to
meet the Millennium Development Goals. In the broader development literature, there is a signiﬁcant body of
evidence showing that charging user fees reduces take-up of public health interventions such as insecticide-treated
bednets or chlorine treatment of drinking water (Yates, 2009; J-PAL, 2011). This evidence suggests that users
themselves do not value public health beneﬁts as much as they ‘should’, and therefore, such public goods require
ongoing subsidy (Kremer and Miguel, 2007). For example, there is clear evidence that, even at very low levels,
user charges put people off using clean water (Null et al., 2012).
Critiques of the institutional impacts of community management have also proliferated. A considerable literature
has noted the dangers of localism, including the risks of elite capture (e.g., Cleaver, 1999; Mohan and Stokke, 2000;
Botchway, 2001; Vollan, 2012). As Mansuri and Rao (2013) have observed, there is a fundamental distinction© 2015 The Authors. Public Administration and Development published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. 35, 263–276 (2015)
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participation that is rooted in a ‘Western “cultural idealization” of communities in low-income countries’ (Harvey and
Reed, 2007: 366). In reality, communities may not be able to fulﬁl the responsibilities allocated to them. Local
government, meanwhile, has in many instances faced an increase in responsibilities without accompanying decentral-
ization of resources or powers (Ribot et al., 2006). As a result, local authorities in most low-income countries are
critically hampered by lack of capacity, characterized by low skills and few resources (Lockwood and Smits,
2011). This analysis suggests that community management may in fact weaken institutional capacity to deliver public
services by placing excessive burdens on communities, and it simultaneously hollows out local government capacity.
Research questions
Despite these critiques, community management remains the option of choice for governments of low-income
countries such as Malawi (GOM, 2005; for the Uganda case, see GOU, 1999). For example, Malawi’s National
Water Policy emphasizes ‘demand responsive and demand-driven approaches, beneﬁciary participation and
empowerment’ (GOM, 2005: 6) – although in the ﬁve pages of the Policy that list the responsibilities of 11
different types of stakeholders, there is no section that explicitly outlines the role of ‘communities’. This
highlights the extent to which the assumptions of community management are so deeply institutionalized that
it is not felt necessary to articulate them.
Community management also remains central to donor policy and practice. For example, (UK) Department for
International Development (DFID’s) current water strategy in Malawi emphasizes that ‘User contributions both tech-
nically and ﬁnancially are an important element of ensuring sustainability of WASH services’ (DFID, 2012a: 12), and
‘for point sources mainly boreholes and rural piped schemes, the principle of “community management” will apply
with beneﬁciaries meeting fully the cost of operation and maintenance’ (Ibid.: 23). In wider DFID policy statements,
community management is taken for granted rather than explicitly justiﬁed (DFID, 2015), and it is striking that recent
reviews have paid scant attention to the question of whether this is an effective delivery model (DFID, 2012b; DFID,
2013). WaterAid, a prominent non-governmental organization (NGO), explains that they promote ‘technologies that
can be operated, managed and ﬁnanced by communities, with assistance from local government and service pro-
viders’ (WaterAid, 2015) – thus, although the organization emphasizes the importance of local government support,
the idea that users should manage and ﬁnance service delivery themselves is not really questioned.
Community management can therefore be seen as an example of a highly successful public sector reform, in the
sense that it has been thoroughly internalized by governments and their development partners. However, the
concerns noted previously suggest that questions remain about the effectiveness of the model:
• Does community management generate the expected levels of technical and ﬁnancial performance?
• Has community management strengthened institutional capacity at local, district and national levels?
• Overall, is community management an efﬁcient and effective model of public service delivery?
The rest of this article addresses these questions using data from a multi-district study in Malawi.METHODS
Study site: Malawi
Malawi is an ideal location in which to research the community management model, for several reasons. Community
management has been the dominant framework for rural water supply in Malawi for the past two decades (GOM,
2005), and the assumption that it will lead to sustainability is deeply ingrained in the minds of government actors
and development partners alike (Soublière and Cloutier, 2015).
A high proportion of the population (84%) are rural dwellers, and the country is poor. Gross national income per
capita in purchasing power parity terms was $780 in 2014, the third lowest in the world after the Central African
Republic and Democratic Republic of the Congo (World Bank, 2015); Malawi’s rating on the Human Development
Index in 2013 was 0.414, placing Malawi 174 out of 187 countries (UNDP, 2014). Nonetheless, Malawi has made© 2015 The Authors. Public Administration and Development published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. 35, 263–276 (2015)
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among the rural population has increased from 34% in 1990 to 86% in 2015 (UNICEF/WHO Joint Monitoring
Programme, 2015b). At the same time, the water sector faces many problems (Lockwood and Kang, 2012), and
despite signiﬁcant investment in new installations and standardization on the Afridev pump type, water point
functionality levels overall remain similar to elsewhere in Africa, at around 70% (WaterAid, 2005; RWSN, 2009;
GOM, 2012).
In common with many low-income countries, Malawi adopted a number of policy reforms in the 1990s and
2000s in line with advice from international ﬁnancial institutions, with effects including large reductions in the civil
service payroll (Anders, 2014). The formalization of community management as the central plank of government
water policy took place during the same period, as did decentralization. Malawi adopted a decentralization policy in
1998, but after elections in 2000, the process was put on hold (Chiweza, 2010) and remained frozen until 2014.
Local governments across the country face signiﬁcant challenges of capacity and commitment (O’Neil et al.,
2014). In some public service sectors (e.g., health and education), there has been a relatively signiﬁcant degree
of devolution of powers together with accompanying resources, but district water ofﬁces have been starved of
funds for many years. The handover of responsibility to communities has thus taken place within a wider context
of (i) stalled decentralization and (ii) marginalization of the water and sanitation sector in particular.Data sources, analysis and limitations
The study used a mixed-methods cross-sectional design. Survey and observational data were collected at 679
water points and from 276 users and committee members (‘Managers’) in 24 randomly sampled VDCs (Village
Development Committees – group villages) in eight TAs (Traditional Authorities – sub-districts) in four purpo-
sively sampled districts, during ﬁeldwork in 2011 and 2012. Two of the districts (Mangochi and Thyolo) had
high levels of reported water point functionality, and the other two (Ntcheu and Chikhwawa) had low levels
of reported functionality. In-depth interviews were also conducted with 26 purposively sampled key informants
at national (n=15), district (n=10) and area mechanic (n=1) levels. The primary data were triangulated with
quantitative analysis of the national water point database, which covers roughly 50 000 cases, and qualitative
analysis of blog posts by 28 international volunteers with the NGO Engineers Without Borders (EWB), working
in District Water Ofﬁces. Table 1 summarizes the data sources. Quantitative data were analysed with SPSS using a
range of statistical tests, and qualitative data were coded in NVivo using both structured and emergent coding. In
the text as follows, quote marks indicate quotes from respondents (often in translation), and brackets indicate
source codes.
Despite careful design, data limitations undoubtedly affect the validity and reliability of the ﬁndings to some
extent. Sampling was performed on the basis of the best available data on functionality, but this was often
subsequently contradicted in the ﬁeld. For example, in Thyolo district, the secondary data suggested that
functionality was 50% in TA Nsabwe and 85% in TA Chimaliro, but we found it to be 70% in Nsabwe and only
64% in Chimaliro. In the survey responses, the unreliability of much self-reported data was highlighted by the
comprehensive nature of the survey and the practice of triangulating between two or three respondents per water
point: Respondents frequently contradicted themselves or their neighbours. These challenges certainly do not
invalidate the ﬁndings, but suggest that all such data must be interpreted with care.Table 1. Data sources for this study
Primary Secondary
Quantitative Surveys: 177 users, 99 managers, 338 surveyed water points, 341
listed water points. Dataset has 955 cases, 266 variables.
2005 water point database: 49 517 cases,
20 variables
Qualitative Survey notes: 177 users, 99 managers, 338 water points. Blogs: 28 sources, 739 posts, spanning
September 2008–February 2013Interviews with 26 respondents: six local government, ﬁve national
government, six donors, nine NGOs, one area mechanic
© 2015 The Authors. Public Administration and Development published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. 35, 263–276 (2015)
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Technical performance
Our ﬁrst question asks whether community management generates the expected levels of technical and ﬁnancial
performance. On the technical side, community management is expected to be characterized by regular mainte-
nance and rapid, high-quality repairs, using locally held stocks of spare parts and local skills. However, our data
suggest that maintenance is almost never done, and repairs are slow and sub-standard.Maintenance
Over half of the Managers (51%; n=49) reported dismantling their water point in the last 12months, although in
only 14 cases was this done without being prompted by a breakdown. Similarly, although 61% (n=60) reported
dismantling the water point to check the wearing parts, in only nine cases was this done for a water point that
had never experienced breakdown. It thus seems that true preventive maintenance is relatively rare. Indeed, it
may well be that maintenance frequency is over-reported: for example, M48 reported maintaining his water point
just ‘last month’ – for the ﬁrst time since installation 8 years earlier. This seems more likely to be an example of
courtesy bias than fact. Most water points are like W051: ‘they never do preventative maintenance; they only do
things to it if it is broken’. As one District Water Ofﬁcer observed: ‘we train the people but … most of them after
training they have not touched the borehole’ (L3).
Indeed, this reluctance to do preventive maintenance is understandable, because many well-built water points,
especially boreholes, function for many years with no problems. For example, W096, a borehole installed in
2003, has never broken down; consequently, the Managers have never checked or maintained it. W051 is another
example: installed in 1998, its ﬁrst breakdown was 11 years later in 2009. For those 11 years, the community did no
maintenance. The same thing was reported at several other boreholes (W092, W259, W260 and W266). Cases such
as these suggest that the ‘standard model’ of dismantling and checking the pump every 3months may often be
unnecessary, especially when water points are well-constructed in the ﬁrst place. Rapid reactive repair capacity
is more important.Breakdowns, repairs and spares
Breakdowns are frequent, and often long-lasting – but there is signiﬁcant variation by district. In TA Mbwana
Nyambi in Mangochi District (where almost all the water points were installed by the high-quality German GITEC
project roughly 7 years earlier), fully 42% of the water points had never broken down. The ﬁgure was much lower
elsewhere: 21% in TAMasache in Chikhwawa District and 8% in TA Chimaliro in Thyolo District (where theft is a
particular problem, affecting more than half of the water points in all three of the VDCs studied). Overall, 25% of
boreholes had never experienced a breakdown, and the vast majority of these were in Mangochi. The overall
picture is clear: A signiﬁcant proportion of water points never break down, while others – probably poor-quality
installations in the ﬁrst place – limp along from repair to repair, often with long hiatus in between.
Repairs under community management are often slow – mean reported breakdown duration was 136 days in our
survey – and sub-standard. One example is the use of an improvised U-seal made out of an old ‘slipper’ (plastic
ﬂipﬂop), reported at several water points (e.g., W100), even though new U-seals are cheap and widely available
in trading centres. A second example is the practice of ﬁxing broken rods by ‘tying them with string’, reported
several times (e.g., in VDC 2B3). These practices, and the (rather more effective) use of welding to ﬁx broken
rod connections, are not due to inaccessibility of spares; in VDC 2B3, the district capital is only 30minutes away
down a major tarmac road with frequent vehicles. Instead, they reﬂect unwillingness or inability to pay.
Few Committees keep spares in stock, and none keeps any record of stocks of spares, nor any log of mainte-
nance or repairs. Although a ‘full set’ of spare parts is often provided by installers, a majority (68%) of Managers
reported having no spares in stock at all. Some committees said they had spares in stock but did not know what they
were (e.g., W284). In fact, it is arguably quite inefﬁcient for each committee to hold stocks of multiple spares that
many of them will not need for several years. Spares may be lost, or converted into cash and ‘eaten’, or simply© 2015 The Authors. Public Administration and Development published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. 35, 263–276 (2015)
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W288, a GITEC borehole whose two breakdowns had both been repaired within 2 days using parts that the
committee had in stock) is very much the exception rather than the rule.Skills
The idea that users should be responsible for basic repairs – with support from Area Mechanics if need be – is
clearly internalized in communities: Only 1% of respondents felt that anyone else (e.g., the District or NGOs)
should be responsible for repairs. However, there is some dissonance between these responses and what is evident
in practice, including considerable reliance on politicians as a source of funds for repairs. There is also a major
capacity gap in the committees. Despite training, many members struggle with the most basic technical aspects
of their role. For example, at W211, the ten committee members were trained in 2009 by the installer for 6 days.
Yet, when the borehole needed a replacement bobbin (a simple job), they could not ﬁx it: ‘When they tried
themselves, it was not sweet’. They were unsure what a U-seal looks like and unable to identify a bush bearing.
A similar situation was found at W768, where the committee believed that the borehole breakdown was due to
‘rubbers’ (i.e., the U-seal, a very simple problem to ﬁx) – but had not actually attempted to open the borehole to
ﬁnd out. At W316, a high-quality GITEC borehole, a User reported: ‘they were trained but they fail to maintain
the borehole. It took the area mechanic to maintain it and since then it has not been dismantled because they are
afraid that they may fail again’ (U55). M52, Chair of another water point, said ‘we don’t maintain it because we
don’t know how the borehole works’.
Some Managers are startlingly uninformed: M32 is Chair of her committee, which she reports as ‘active’ – but
she does not know when they last met or who came to the meeting, nor who the treasurer is; while M74, another
Chair, ‘cannot mention anything on the parts of the borehole’ (i.e., she knows nothing about it). In many
cases (e.g., W497,W501 andW513), committees were reported to be ‘trained, but not active’. Explanations for loss of
committee capacity include migration (for marriage and for work) and death (e.g., M52). A respondent at W495 spoke
for manywhen he observed that ‘wewere trained but we have no skills’. An EngineersWithout Borders (EWB) fellow
working on a borehole rehabilitation project noted many water points ‘only had a few broken parts that could easily
have been replaced if the Water Point Committee responsible for the well had taken action’ (B16). But even where
skills are available, it often takes weeks or months to repair a water point, because it takes time to collect funds to
pay for spare parts. However, and rather surprisingly, the data show no statistical relationship between existence of
a (reportedly) active committee, and water point functionality.
Given the very weak level of technical skills within user committees, the role of Area Mechanics (individuals
with additional training) is perceived as critically important by national and local government staff (L3). Such
mechanics are not universally available – there was an active network of them in only one of the four districts
we studied – but elsewhere there are often ‘unofﬁcial’ Area Mechanics, providing an important intermediate level
of technical support to village-level Managers. However, their services are only available to users who can pay.
Additionally, there are concerns in some places about the effects of equipping people with such skills. One District
Water Ofﬁcer despaired: ‘There is a lot of vandalism. We have trained so many people and now they are able to
[remove] these small bolts and move these parts and take them to other parts and sell them. So we are training even
robbers’ (L3). In summary, therefore, community management does not always ensure that the required skills are
locally available; and even when it does, there may be unwanted side-effects.
Financial performance
On the ﬁnancial side, community management is expected to be characterized by users collecting and saving
adequate funds to pay for maintenance and repairs, thus relieving the state (and/or donors) of the burden of recurrent
costs. However, this study suggests that users face major difﬁculties in collecting and saving funds and that this is a
major determinant of non-functionality.
In Malawi, users of community-managed water points were typically expected to pay MWK 50 per month – a
ﬁgure that should (for average communities and average water points) yield enough income to cover maintenance© 2015 The Authors. Public Administration and Development published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. 35, 263–276 (2015)
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occasionally and 25% never pay at all. One-quarter of respondents indicated that some households (normally the
elderly) are exempt from payment. Among those respondents who indicate that the community does pay into a water
point maintenance fund, 51% says that ‘all or almost all’ of those who are supposed to pay do indeed pay, while 31%
says that ‘about three-quarters’ do. Twenty-six percent of respondents say that there is no penalty for non-payment,
while 48% indicates that non-payers are banned from using the water point. The responses therefore paint a picture of
payment systems that are not fully consistent, but not completely broken down either.
However, further questioning suggests a more complex situation. Because most respondents report making regular
or occasional payments, in theory, most committees should have signiﬁcant amounts saved for maintenance and
repairs. We have data on this question from 86/99 Managers, of whom 24 (28%) did not know how much was in
the Maintenance Fund, 19 (22%) said there was nothing and 8 (9%) said the question was not applicable (presumably
because there is no such fund). Among the 54 Managers who knew how much was held in the Maintenance Fund, the
median amount saved was MWK 1150 (mean 2169, mode 0, range 0–11700). MWK 1150 was worth about £2.75 in
July 2012. To put this another way, only 11 out of 86 Managers reported that enough had been saved to buy a single
replacement rod costing MWK 4000.
Another way to examine the adequacy of the community management ﬁnancial model is to compare actual with
expected savings (calculated based on the number of households using the water point, the frequency of payments,
the size of payments, the age of the water point and the amount previously expended on maintenance and repairs).
We were able to do this for 30 cases in our dataset. In virtually every case, the discrepancy is enormous; in only
three cases does the Maintenance Fund hold more than one-ﬁfth of the amount it ought to, and in the majority
of cases, it holds only 1% or less. On average, the amount saved is just 2% of what it should be. The sheer scale
of this variance strongly suggests that the ﬁnancial assumptions underpinning the community management model
are in serious need of revision: Communities are clearly unable to collect and save sufﬁcient funds to adequately
maintain and repair their water points.
Responses suggested that there are two broad reasons for this: (1) money is not collected in the ﬁrst place –
because people are too poor to pay, because income is very seasonal or because contributing to this fund is less urgent
than other expenditure, (or ;) and (2) money is collected, but is badly managed or misused – because it is difﬁcult to
keep pots of money separate, because the Village Head asks for it or because the committee members ‘borrow’ it for
business or for emergencies. In practice, the latter often leads to the former, because if people suspect that the fund is
misused (as was indeed reported by a large number of respondents), they stop contributing. Numerous examples were
given by respondents of committee members misusing funds intended for maintenance and repair of the water point
(e.g., U19, U26, U27, M20, M23, U43, U47, M37, M38, M48, W318, W495, W499, M62, W527, M63, W536,
W553, U108, U117, U123, M84, U144 and U162). Typical comments included the following: ‘Some people don’t
contribute because people in the past contributed and the committee misused the cash’ (U19); ‘People refuse to
contribute because they don’t believe the committee, they think that they use the cash for their families’ (M23);
‘the committee eats the money … they misuse the funds and buy their own needs’ (U47); ‘The old committee took
the money for the borehole and made their business with it’ (W553). This lack of trust means that ﬁnances are
managed on an ad hoc basis, with money being collected only when urgently needed (i.e., after a breakdown) – a
process that may take a long time. Essentially, the ‘just in case’ ﬁnancial model that underpins the theory of commu-
nity management is a ﬁction.Institutional performance
The evidence presented previously shows clearly that community management, as a public sector reform, has not
led to the expected beneﬁts in terms of technical and ﬁnancial performance. Instead, a picture emerges of a rural
water supply sector in which performance ‘limps along’: maintenance is absent and repairs are ‘make do and
mend’; savings are almost non-existent, and funds are instead collected on an ad hoc basis after breakdown occurs.
What about the institutional effects of the model – has community management strengthened institutional capacity
at local, district and national level?© 2015 The Authors. Public Administration and Development published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. 35, 263–276 (2015)
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As already noted, water user committees struggle to perform both their functions – technical and ﬁnancial – to
expected standards. Indeed, many are essentially dormant most of the time, and are only reconstituted ‘as needed’
– that is, when the water point breaks down. Committee membership naturally declines, through people moving
away or dying, and those that remain gradually lose enthusiasm. Respondents identiﬁed several reasons why com-
mittees may feel there is no need to meet, or do maintenance, or collect money: if the water point functions well for
months or years without any inputs; if there are other people who seem likely to take responsibility if things go
wrong, such as an Member of Parliament (MP) or NGO (N2, L6); and/or if there is no external agent monitoring
them (D1). Overall, a clear picture emerges of the fragility of the basic building block of community management,
the user committee. The sad irony is that such committees were supposed to be a sustainable management solution
to the problem of non-functional technical hardware – but they seem to be equally, if not more, prone to failure.District capacity
Districts have two key functions in community management: facilitating investment (often undertaken by NGOs,
but sometimes directly by districts) and providing post-construction support (PCS) to user committees, which has
been identiﬁed as a key determinant of functionality (Whittington et al., 2008).
In our study, Managers reported generally very low levels of PCS: 71% received none from the installer, and
57% received none from any source (although levels were higher in Mangochi district). Of those that received
PCS more than once, less than half (8/17) were satisﬁed; and cross tabulation suggests there is little relationship
between such support and functionality: 77% of water points that had received ‘good’ PCS (two or more visits)
were functional, but so were 72% of those where no PCS was received at all. A clear pattern emerged: Support
is not usually requested; and even if it is, it is usually not forthcoming. Most communities with a broken-down
water point had not reported it to anyone outside the village, even though this is supposed to be one of the roles
of local government structures. Even when communities do report breakdowns and request assistance, support is
usually not forthcoming (W568; W570). Politicians were in fact mentioned more frequently than any other source
of external support, but their input tends to be concentrated at the time of election campaigns – with one or two
honourable exceptions (VDC 4A3).
District Water Ofﬁcers are also supposed to coordinate investment in the rural water sector, directing NGOs to
the areas of greatest need and supervising installations. However, in practice, they are often bypassed: Our research
found numerous examples of water points that had been installed with no district consultation (for example, by
well-meaning church groups). Districts have to take on support responsibilities for such installations even when
they had no involvement in the decision to install. They are also supposed to supervise drilling, but are entirely
dependent on the installers for transport (and ‘allowances’) to facilitate such supervision.
All Districts Water Ofﬁcers report that they are hamstrung by lack of staff and lack of operational funding: ‘We
don’t have enough resources’ (L2). They receive very limited funds from central government – barely enough to
cover ofﬁce expenses, let alone provide support to communities. As one explained: ‘This month we got 59,000
and we spent 35,000 on annual rental for our postal box. Then we pay water bills, electricity bills, we buy reams
of paper, then the money is ﬁnished’ (L5). The detrimental effect on their ability to fulﬁl their responsibilities was
captured by an EWB Fellow: ‘More times than I can count, I have come in to the ofﬁce just to see the whole staff
sitting outside under a tree playing checkers or bawo all day – not because of laziness, but instead because there is
no funding for fuel, motorcycle maintenance, or some other necessary item to do their work. Village meetings
should be attended by our staff but are not, borehole drillings should be overseen by our staff but they aren’t,
and so on and so forth – all due to lack of funding’ (B20). Similar problems of District inactivity were reported
by other EWB Fellows (B15, B17 and B13), but not always attributed simply to lack of funding. Other factors
noted included an unwillingness to engage with ‘capacity-building’ (B15 and B24) and the ‘allowance culture’
whereby staff appeared willing to undertake activity (such as ﬁeld visits) only if they received additional ﬁnancial
incentives beyond their salaries (B17, B6, B11 and B27). These observers suggest that District staff do not just lack
funding, but also (in some cases) motivation.© 2015 The Authors. Public Administration and Development published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. 35, 263–276 (2015)
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very limited. Part of the problem relates to lack of suitable staff and absence of performance management, but a
signiﬁcant part relates simply to lack of funding. Under community management, control over capital expenditure
remains largely centralized, while funding for operation and maintenance is removed from the government budget
entirely. Decentralization has left the districts with responsibilities, but no resources.National
At the national level, two main trends can be observed: (1) the concentration of funding in large projects (urban water
supply and, to a more limited extent, gravity-fed schemes) and (2) the marginalization of the water Ministry.
Although investment in the sector increased from 1% of the government budget in 2005/2006 to 3% in 2010/2011,
this remained only a fraction of the allocation to other sectors, including education and health (16% each) and
agriculture (8%) (GOM, 2012). Furthermore, only a tiny proportion of the water budget is devoted to rural water
supply. More than half of the 2010/2011 water budget was allocated to the National Water Development Programme
(focused on urban supply and large piped schemes), and most of the remainder went to irrigation, leaving only about
1% of the budget for borehole construction in rural areas (GOM, 2012: 14) – despite the fact that 85% of the
population are rural, and mostly dependent on boreholes.
At the same time, the Ministry appears to have become increasingly politically marginalized. In recent years, it
has experienced frequent reorganization and renaming. In the most recent reshufﬂe, it lost Ministerial status and has
been downgraded into a Department and absorbed into the Ministry of Agriculture.
Researchers have observed that, although there are considerable challenges facing delivery of public services
in all sectors in Malawi, the water sector is particularly weak (O’Neil et al., 2014). It seems plausible that the
mode of service delivery in the sector may be linked to this fact, because it ‘outsources’ ongoing service provi-
sion to users themselves. Nonetheless, interviews in mid-2015 with individuals working in the Department of
Water demonstrated that they remain strongly committed to community management. The next section discusses
why this may be.DISCUSSION
The key ﬁndings of this study are clear: Community management does not work well for communities. The ﬁnd-
ings conﬁrm many of the concerns and critiques outlined earlier in this paper (e.g., Mansuri and Rao, 2013) and
help explain why community management is the least preferred management option for water users (Hope,
2015). Nonetheless – and despite its undermining effects on local and national government outlined previously
– community management endures because at some level it does indeed ‘work’ for the state (and donors).
Speciﬁcally, it enables them to abdicate long-term responsibility for service provision. The degree to which this
is found to be useful can be seen in the emphasis placed by ofﬁcials at all levels on the failures of communities
and ‘lack of local ownership’ as the explanation for problems in the sector.
Implications for doing development differently
The commitment in the development community to ‘local ownership’ remains strong, and the principle attractive.
The ﬁrst three of the six ‘doing development differently’ manifesto principles emphasize local problems, local
ownership and local convenors. But questions remain as to how these principles, and problem-driven iterative
adaptation (Andrews, 2013), would help solve the challenges of community management, and how to distinguish
between the more and less positive aspects of local agents and structures.
This study highlights the need to take a nuanced approach to identifying ‘the local’, because different groups
deﬁne problems in different ways. For example, Ministry ofﬁcials tend to identify the root cause of non-functional
water points as ‘lack of ownership by the users’, and propose solutions involving more training and exhortation of
users to ‘fulﬁl their responsibilities’ under community management. However, if the perspectives of the Districts
and the users themselves are taken as a starting point, alternative analyses may emerge: District staff might suggest© 2015 The Authors. Public Administration and Development published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. 35, 263–276 (2015)
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problems such as frequent breakdowns, long repair times and unaffordable costs. Different solutions might emerge
accordingly. Perhaps it is unnecessary (even wasteful) to train so many amateur committee members, many of
whom will never put their training into practice, when all that is really needed is a handful of mechanics in each
TA with really good technical skills plus easy access to parts. Perhaps it is both unrealistic and unfair to expect
users to bear all recurrent costs, and donors should instead allocate a small proportion of their budgets to pay these
area mechanics, via the districts, on the basis of their performance in improving functionality.
Problem-driven iterative adaptation and doing development differently focus on problem deﬁnition as the
critically important ﬁrst step and imply that the key ‘local’ stakeholders are people working in local and national
government of the country in question. But might problems be mis-speciﬁed by key stakeholders? In this study,
almost all key stakeholders interviewed at the national and district levels (government ofﬁcials, donors and NGOs)
identiﬁed the problem as ‘lack of local [meaning community/village] ownership’. When pressed further, assump-
tions articulated included ‘communities are lazy’, ‘our people have become dependent’ and ‘the villagers need
more training to understand their responsibilities’. As already discussed, both the state and donors have strong
incentives to identify the problem as ‘the communities’ rather than the community management model itself. If
identiﬁcation of the problem is constrained because the stakeholders have an interest in laying blame elsewhere,
the problem-solving process is hamstrung from the start. Perhaps a ﬁrst step towards addressing this would be to
ensure that any ‘scapegoats’ (such as water point users and managers, in this case) are themselves meaningfully
included in the problem identiﬁcation process.
The shape of ‘locally led reform’, then, will depend critically on how the problem is framed, and by whom.
Simply ‘being local’ does not automatically translate into a clearer ability to deﬁne problems. In this case,
Malawians working in the Ministry tend to display a very ﬁrm allegiance to the theory of community manage-
ment, even when presented with clear evidence of its shortcomings in practice. Thus, reform efforts that are
rooted in ‘locally driven’ problem identiﬁcation must give careful thought to what sort of ‘local’ voices are being
ampliﬁed.What might an alternative framework look like?
The critique presented here does not claim that community management does not work at all; on the contrary, I
have emphasized the way in which it enables rural water supply to ‘limp along’ from breakdown to breakdown,
maintaining overall a fairly steady (if less than impressive) level of functionality, around 70%. But this article does
argue that community management works much less well than it is supposed to and should be reformed. Two sets
of ideas seem to hold potential as a basis for an alternative framework.
The ﬁrst is the idea of ‘working with the grain’ of existing socially embedded institutions, which draws on the
ideas articulated by Kelsall (2008) and Levy (2015), as well as Cleaver (2012) on institutional bricolage. This study
highlights a number of ways in which community management is reshaped by such institutions, such as the
phenomenon of village heads controlling user committees, and the ﬂurry of politician-funded water sector activity
that precedes elections. One approach to revising community management could involve engaging more wisely
and explicitly with existing local rules of the game, such as exploring ways to involve chiefs more positively in
water point management, or considering how to shape incentives to increase the political salience of water supply
beyond election periods (Batley and McLoughlin, 2015).
The second theme is the need to refocus away from the local and pay more attention to questions of profes-
sionalization, upward accountability and indeed centralization. Research on public services in Malawi and
elsewhere has shown that top-down performance discipline is a key determinant of effective service delivery
(Cammack and Kanyongolo, 2010; Booth, 2012). Elements that are needed in an alternative post-community
management framework include the following: (i) increased funding for recurrent costs; (ii) directing more
funding to and via the districts; (iii) paying for outcomes (sustained delivery of clean water) rather than outputs
(numbers of water points constructed); (iv) increased professionalization of technical tasks, with maintenance
and repair by area mechanics rather than users; and (v) closer supervision, inspection and audit of installations.© 2015 The Authors. Public Administration and Development published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. 35, 263–276 (2015)
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This article sets out to ask what might be learned from one very particular type of public sector reform, community
management of rural water supply. Three key lessons have emerged: (1) community management has ‘worked’ for
the state (and donors) as a means of ofﬂoading responsibility for public service provision; but (2) it has not worked
for communities in terms of delivering the expected technical and ﬁnancial beneﬁts. Therefore, (3) efforts to
promote ‘local ownership’ in development must be undertaken with care.
We have seen that community management has been an effectively introduced public sector reform: It has
replaced, wholesale, the previous mode of service delivery and retains enduring strong support among govern-
ment ofﬁcials and, to a lesser extent, donors. In no other public service sector has decentralization been pursued
to such an extreme. We have also seen that the expected beneﬁts of the model – improved technical performance
and improved ﬁnancial sustainability – have not been realized in practice. In this sense, community management
cannot be called a ‘success’, because it has imposed unrealistic management burdens on users. Users do not fully
value the health beneﬁts of clean water, and they face serious collective action problems in managing water
supplies themselves. As a result, performance is sub-optimal: Community management is not an efﬁcient or
effective framework for public service delivery.
The article has also highlighted the risks of placing too much emphasis on ‘local ownership’. Too often this can
be a convenient ﬁg-leaf for abdication of responsibility by those with power and resources. This is not a reason to
automatically reject ‘localist’ approaches, but it does suggest a need for care in pursuing them. In fact, in rural
water supply, the pendulum arguably needs to swing in the other direction, towards a more ‘universalist’ approach,
characterized by more centralization, standardization, professionalization and upward accountability.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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